An ecology of governance: politics, institutions and regulations by Gale, FP












The world ‘governance’ can be traced back to Middle English and its roots in the Old French term ‘gouvernance’, with the Oxford English Dictionary defining it as ‘the action or manner of governing’ and ‘the state of being governance’.​[2]​ By the 1970s, term was quite widespread in the higher education field to refer to ‘university governance’. Its first major use in international politics was by James Rosenau, who penned an essay in 1987 for the Institute of Transnational Studies at the University of South California,​[3]​ which later became the basis for his edited book (with Czempiel) Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics.​[4]​  The term was quickly taken up by scholars of international politics field to understand how cooperation was possible in the absence of an authoritative, coercive, global government. The governance literature built on the established literature on international institutions, where ‘regimes’ created by states were viewed as resolving problems related to uncertainty, lack of transparency and fear of defection by creating a ‘shadow of the future’, facilitating monitoring, and enhancing ‘reputational power’.​[5]​ 

Around the same time in the field of public policy, it began to be clear that the ‘traditional’ public sector management was giving way to the ‘new public sector management’. The state, in this view, was governed by governments which legislated, monitored, policed and enforced rules and regulations that were top down, precise, rigid and non-delegated. In the field of public administration, authors like Rhodes began to argue that governments did not really conform to the responsible government notions of first year texts.​[6]​ Rather, governments were increasingly governing through networks, the major partners of which were business corporations, giving rise to a large literature on public-private partnerships and private governance. Since then, the policy network literature has broadened and deepened with alternative typologies of network types and of the ‘governance’ arrangements that occur within them. 

In the area of legal studies, too, there has been a great deal of debate and discussion on new modes of regulation, ‘smart regulation’, and the general shift from hard to soft law over the past two decades. In the past the general orientation of legal scholars has been to distinguish between positive and customary law, the former emerging from legislation and in rulings by judges; the latter standing as a set of common practices within communities. As customary law became increasingly validated through the court systems of North America in the 1980s, often as a result of claims by indigenous Americans, the reality that common ‘law’ could trump positive law increasingly became appreciated. Meanwhile, in the international legal sphere, treaties increasingly contained non-binding requirements that states ultimately implemented, again challenging the idea that regulation had to be backed up by coercion to prove effective. Thus, increasingly, legal scholars began addressing the distinction between ‘hard law’ and ‘soft law’ and with increasing sympathy towards the latter.​[7]​ 

By the late 1990s, a large literature had grown up in each of these disciplines, but less effort had been expended in integrating the concept of governance across disciplines. Today, however, recent literature is explicitly recognising the fact that there are important synergies between these fields and recent scholarship on governance is turning its attention to understanding the various dimensions of the governance concept broadly conceived.​[8]​ In a path-breaking article, initially written in 2005 and recently updated and published, Treib, Bahr and Falkner (2007) persuasively argue that there are three dimensions of governance, defined as the “steering and coordination of interdependent (usually collective) actors based on institutionalised rule systems”.​[9]​ These dimensions involve actors (politics dimension), institutions (polity dimension) and regulation (policy dimension). Their article attempts to describe the “modes of governance” that occur within each of these dimensions by focusing on the policy dimension. 

Governance and Modes of Governance
Treib et al define a mode of governance in relation to its location on a state intervention—societal autonomy continuum. They also propose a two-stage approach to conceptualising governance modes. The first involves examining modes of governance in each dimension separately. Once clarity has been achieved within each dimension, a more comprehensive analysis could be carried out that might “result in an overall picture of changing modes of governance within the nation states or within other polities such as the European Union”.​[10]​ With respect to the first stage, and focusing on whether the policy is legally binding or voluntary and whether it is rigid or flexible in content, they identify four major modes of governance in the policy dimension. These are coercion, targeting, framework regulation and voluntarism.

Treib et al are silent on why a group of interdependent actors might choose one MG-RD over another and we would have to look at the political and, perhaps, the institutional dimension to understand this issue. What they essentially argue, however, is that any set of actors in any set of institutions confront essential four fundamental choices among modes of governance in the regulatory dimension. If coercion is chosen, then actors will need to agree on a set of binding regulations that are rigid and inflexible. The closest international example of such an arrangement would be the World Trade Organization and its binding provisions related to tariff and non-tariff barriers, which are coupled with an institutional mechanism to adjudicate disputes and legitimate penalties. 

Actors frequently experience great difficulty in reaching international agreements that are based on coercion. Consequently, they are likely to embrace on of the other modes of governance in the policy dimension. One such mode that offers more flexibility is the framework agreement, which requires actors to bind themselves to specific regulatory outcomes but does not prescribe how actors are to achieve those outcomes. Framework agreements have been widely used since the 1980s in the international environmental policy field, with the 1983 Vienna Convention on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer paving the way for the adoption of the much more coercive 1985 Montreal Protocol; and the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change paving the way for the more coercive 1997 Kyoto Protocol. 

Both coercion and framework agreements require binding ‘legal’ instruments to be negotiated between parties and are distinguished by their degree of flexibility. The alternative is to negotiate ‘non-binding’ arrangements, which generate two other options: targeting and voluntarism. According to Treib et al, targeting involves actors agreeing on the desirability a certain goal. It is a non-binding goal, however, so if actors do not achieve it there are no legal consequences. The target is rigid in that there is only one mechanism to achieve the goal—little flexibility is permitted. One example of such targeting would be the United Nations’ target for developed countries to contribute 0.7% of GNP in aid to developing countries. The target was adopted at the 1970 United Nations General Assembly but, as is well known, only a handful of countries have ever achieved it. 

Finally, the weakest of the governance modes in the policy dimension is voluntary arrangements. These are both non-binding and flexible, presumably resulting in considerable difficulty in determining whether they are being implemented or not. Much of the language emerging from international meetings exhorting states to undertake activities with no targets, timelines or monitoring mechanisms conforms to this voluntarist mode of governance. International forestry negotiations provide an excellent example, in the form of the 1992 UNCED Forest Principles and the 2007 United Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF) Non-Legally Binding Instrument for All Types of Forests. Neither imposes any obligations on nation states on how to manage their forests, while the definition of sustainable forest management embedded within the agreements is sufficiently diffuse to be capable of a wide range of alternative meanings. 

The utility of Treib et al’s approach to understanding modes of governance in the policy dimension with respect to climate change is revealed in the above analysis. It usefully distinguishes between the various options that are available to the international community with respect to climate change negotiations. While there is hope that a legally binding agreement with substantive targets can be negotiated to reduce CO2 emissions utilising a mixture of rigid and flexible instruments, the fear remains that a much weaker approach will be adopted. At the extreme if negotiations break down this could result in a non-binding commitment by developed and developing countries to ‘take action’ on climate change with targets and mechanisms determined unilaterally by individual governments. A substantial number of intermediate options are, however, more likely including a legally binding agreement that sets low targets and provides several loopholes for countries to avoid taking substantive action. Notwithstanding the insights to be garnered from Treib et al’s article, there are several key assumptions buried within it that need to be explored if a more generally applicable approach to understanding modes of governance is to be developed. The key assumptions focused on here are: (a) a public-private split; (b) a hierarchy-market dichotomy; and (c) the binding-rigid dichotomy; and (d). These are explored in detail in the next sections. 

Modes of Governance Assumptions: a Critique
The core assumption underlying Treib el al’s analysis is that actors can be located along a public-private dichotomy, with state actors occupying one side and private actors, the other. This is explicit in their ‘hub and spikes’ diagram, which sets out ‘existing conceptions of governance’ based on either ‘state intervention’ or ‘societal autonomy’.​[11]​ If the poles with respect to all modes of governance across all dimensions in this hub and spikes model are considered, at one end there is an ideal-type of traditional ‘command and control’ public administration or, applied to the international system, of supranationalism. This is an arrangement characterised by an authoritative public actor—the nation state or supranational government—operating under institutionalised arrangements of hierarchy and centralised control that establishes legally binding regulations that are inflexibly enforced via an escalating range of penalties. At the other pole, an ideal-type exists composed of private actors negotiating non-binding voluntary arrangements that are flexibly implemented through the market. 

There are two problems with Treib et al’s approach. First, the scheme does not adequately distinguish between types of private actors, and lumps those operating on the basis of profitable self-interest together with those motivated by other-regarding, rights-based, voluntarism. This constitutes a category error. Businesses utilize markets to secure profit, market share and brand recognition. Their actions are self-regarding and designed to benefit the firm, the industry and the wider community in that order. In contrast, civil society organisations (CSOs) utilise networks to foment solicarity within their movements and influence those outside. Their primary motivation is other-regarding and, however wrong-headed they may appear, designed to benefit society, the movement, and the organisation in that order. Introducing the categorical distinction between public, business and civil society organizations complicates the analysis of governance arrangements. However, the distinction can be relatively easily accommodated within Treib et al’s diagram by dividing the right-hand side ‘politics’ category in two. Instead of simply referring to ‘only private actors involved’, we can refer to ‘only private business actors involved’ and only ‘private civil society actors involved’. While this solution enables us to recognise the existence of two different categories of private actors, it does not address the more fundamental problem with the diagram, which is its tendency to pull our attention outwards towards the ideal-type extremes. 

Thus, the second difficulty with Treib et al’s approach is that it potentially over-emphasises the purely public and purely private approaches to governance at the expense of one of its more notably features—hybridity. Much of the governance literature has remarked on how the new realm of governance is marked by hybrid relationships rather than pure instances of one or another ideal type.​[12]​ The fact is that mixed groups of actors utilising varying institutional forms that combine a diversity of public policy and regulatory instruments is the norm, not the exception, when it comes to instances of governance at all levels of analysis. If this is the case, then the governance ‘action’ in Treib et al’s hub and spikes model is located in the complex centre of the diagram, not at the extremes. 

With respect to Treib et al’s discussion of modes of governance in the polity dimension, there are serious difficulties in their contention that institutional arrangements exist along a hierarchy-market continuum. Although recent socio-political arrangements have privileged the state (in the early part of the 20th century) and the market (in the latter part of the 20th century), there are other institutional arrangements beyond either. Notably, actors in socio-political networks undertake ‘appropriate’ action based on a particular framework of ideas that informs their understanding of the nature of ‘reality’. Their actions are deeply socialised and discursively justified to one another and to larger audiences (even if these larger audiences view them as lunatics). It is simply not the case that social networks lie somewhere on a continuum between a hierarchical state mode of governance and a non-hierarchical, horizontal market mode of governance. Networks are different from both and are recognised as different in much of the governance literature.​[13]​ 

There is another potential problem with Treib et al’s analysis of modes of governance in the policy dimension. This is that a focus on instrument types alone tells us nothing about the degree to which practices may change on the ground. Consider the two modes of governance of coercion. Within the schema, the coercive mode emerges as superior to the other modes because it is a consequence of both binding and rigid rules. But the effectiveness of binding and rigid rules in addressing any particular policy issue entirely depends on where they set the bar. If the bar is set at a level at or below what most actors are doing already, agreement on a binding, rigid coercive treaty may be feasible but its effectiveness would be in doubt. While this is not exclusively Treib et al’s problem, any analysis of governance needs to be constantly alive to this issue, since there is considerable evidence at national and international levels that the compromises necessary to get agreement on coercive policies result in regulatory arrangements that are insufficient to address the problem they were ostensibly designed to fix. 

Modes of Governance in the Politics Dimension
In short, then, Treib et al’s article constitutes an excellent departure point for reflecting on governance and modes of governance. However, it needs to be elaborated to take into account the above criticisms. Inevitably, this will require complicating their analysis so that it addresses the distinction between business and civil society actors; between bureaucracies, markets and networks; and between substantive and rhetorical policies. An effort to sketch out this more complex approach is made below, the key components of which are set out in Figure 1. Figure 1 builds its understanding of governance from the inside out. It starts with an analysis of the actors involved in the policy making process, referred to as the politics dimension. There are three basic types: actors located in governments; actors located in businesses; and actors located in civil society organizations. In this dimension, there has been a shift over the past twenty years from purer forms of state-based governance to various combinations of state and non-state actors. While much of the governance literature has tended to treat this as a move as one in which governmental officials increasingly reach out to business and civil society actors to get things done, there is a literature on ‘private’ and ‘civil society’ governance that builds on the understanding that both actor types have long governed at least their members with significant public policy consequences. In the business sector, industry associations linked to the development of national and international standards have played key roles in some states. The American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) are two prominent examples. In the civil society sector, the Catholic church has governed its parishioners for millennia and, with respect to public policy issues on which it takes a moral stance—such as divorce, marriage, abortion, gay rights, education and euthanasia—has significantly affected public policy. 










A key aspect of the CSA scheme is that the criteria and indicators attached to the scheme to provide the ‘performance based’ benchmarks were developed through a state-based process under the auspices of the Canadian Council of Forest Ministers (CCFM). Thus, although the CSA scheme was largely funded by industry (via the Canadian Pulp and Paper Association and the Canadian Sustainable Forest Certification Coalition), agents of the state were heavily involved in the early discussions concerning the type of standard that might be developed as well as its substantive content. An official of NRCan contributed an early draft of the CSA standard, while state forestry officials managed the C&I process. There was, it also has to be noted, a considered and exclusive strategy behind this initiative. The CSA Standard was developed via a Canadian government-business forestry network that felt deeply threatened by the nascent civil society-business initiative of the FSC. This highlights that governance arrangements may be as equally liable as governmental arrangements to management by sectoral interests. They are not, in themselves, better and the ‘quality’ of a governance arrangement requires analysis to determine if it actually promotes the norms that many associate with governance—deliberation, transparency, accountability, openness, participation, and so forth.​[14]​ 

In the realm of international politics, an excellent example of state-civil society partnerships is the World Bank-WWF Global Forest Alliance. Established in 1998, the Alliance aims to protect the world’s forests by achieving a 10 percent reduction in deforestation rates by 2010. The World Bank has benefited from the added consultation it has been able to undertake with respect to its forest development projects enabling it to engage in deeper, wider and more representative dialogue with forest stakeholders. The Bank has also recalibrated its forest policy to reflect this additional stakeholder input, enabling it to emphasise credible, third-party forest certification as a key component of sustainable forest management. WWF has benefitted from working through governmental departments in countries of interest, from the increased resources available to fund responsible forest management in those countries, and from increased access to World Bank officials. In practical terms, the Alliance has translated into on the ground protection of forests in Congo, Brazil and Indonesia.​[15]​ 

The Marine Stewardship Council provides a powerful example of business-civil society collaboration to certify fisheries as sustainable according to agreed criteria. The MSC was established in 1999 as a joint initiative of Unilever and WWF. Unilever, representing huge fisheries interests in its capacity as a food multinational delivering products from the sea to supermarkets, was increasingly aware that the management of many fisheries was unsustainable and that this component of its business operation was in jeopardy unless action was taken. WWF, likewise, was deeply concerned about the unsustainability of the world’s fisheries and, building on its recently successful foray forest certification, sought to get an initiative going in the fisheries field. While both parties have subsequently retired into the background as MSC has been institutionalised over the past decade, the governance structure of MSC still evidences a strong business-civil society partnership.​[16]​ 

An interesting example of tripartite governance involving government, business and civil society organisations is the recent collaboration that occurred in British Columbia, Canada, over the Great Bear Rainforest. The agreement was negotiated in 2006 between environmentalists, forestry companies, First Nations, and the Government of British Columbia and contains three elements: an ecosystem-based approach to forest management; support for affected communities; and an increase in First Nation’s involvement in decision making over their traditional territories. The process of constituting this tripartite arrangement is well described by Howlett, Rayner and Tollefson and involved, eventually, the BC government negotiating a Land and Resource Management Plan covering 4.7 million ha of BC’s Central Coast Region with affected parties.​[17]​ The Agreement involved government-to-government negotiations with BC’s First Nations groups organised under the Coastal First Nations coalition (CFN); and the adoption of an ecosystem-based approach to forest management that had been agreed between provincial environmental groups and forest companies as part of the Joint Solutions Project (JSP). 

Summarising this section, therefore, and linking it back to Treib et al’s original concern with spelling out modes of governance in the politics dimension (MGPD), we can perceive three major modes of governance based on the interests they incorporate: unipartite, bipartite and tripartite. These different modes conceive actors as either acting alone or in different combinations with each other to achieve a set of objectives. The unipartite option is available to all three actor types and there are several examples in the environmental sphere of such governance arrangements undertaken by governments, businesses and civil society groups. The BC Government’s 1990 experiment with the Forest Practices Code is a good example of a unilateral initiative that was criticised by business for being onerous and costly and by environmentalists for being insufficiently rigorous and poorly implemented.​[18]​ This attempt at unipartite governmental regulation of forest practices was abandoned in 2001 by the incoming BC Liberal Government in favour of a more industry-friendly ‘performance based’ approach. An example of governance involving unipartite business action is the chemical industry’s Responsible Care program that was put in place after the Bhopal disaster in India in 1984. Initially an initiative of the Canadian Chemical Producers Association (CCPA), the program has now diffused around the world and is now managed at the global level by the International Council of Chemical Associations (ICCA). Responsible Care consists of a code of practice designed to minimise the risk of subsequent chemical disasters.​[19]​ Finally, unipartite governance action by civil society is evident in several schemes. One recent example comes from the climate change issue area and consists of the development of the Gold Standard, a voluntary carbon offset standard that aims to compete with industry-back standards, especially the Voluntary Carbon Standard. Supporters of the Gold Standard include David Suzuki Foundation, Greenpeace International and WWF International.​[20]​  

As already discussed, the CSA Sustainable Forestry Standard is an example of a bilateral business-government governance arrangement. More generally, public private partnerships between government and business have developed extensively in the past two decades under the influence of the New Public Sector Management. Such partnerships are well advanced, of course, in many other sectors including hospital and prison management and the provision of transportation and wastewater services.​[21]​ Bilateral governance arrangements involving government and civil society groups have formed in several areas, notably in the community forestry sector. In British Columbia, not-for-profit groups such as the Harrop Proctor Community Cooperative are licensed by the provincial government to manage almost 11,000 ha of forest in the Kootenay region under a 25-year Community Forestry Agreement.​[22]​ Finally, while the Great Bear Rainforest Agreement is an excellent example of tripartite governance, it is not the only one. In South Africa, the Forest Stewardship Council is the de facto arrangement for forest governance, linking the South African government with forest industry and civil society groups in the management of its controversial plantation forests. In the UK, too, the Forestry Commission has engaged in extensive consultation with business and civil society to develop an FSC-compatible United Kingdom Woodland Assurance Scheme forestry standard.​[23]​ 

Modes of Governance in the Institutional Dimension (Bargaining)
Moving outwards from the centre of Figure 1, the two institutional dimensions of government (or ‘polity dimension’ in Treib et al’s discussion) are next considered. We have already noted one difficulty with Treib et al’s analysis: that networks do not lie on a continuum from hierarchy to markets but have a legitimate claim to be a governance institution in their own right. However, focusing on only the three institutional modes of governance of hierarchy, market and network constitutes a thin approach to understanding governance institutions and tells us nothing about the modus operandi of institutions across such critical variables as accountability, transparency, openness, representativeness, and so forth. Since we have already noted that actors adopt a strategic approach to get what they want from specific governance arrangements, we need an institutional analysis of governance that goes beyond merely identifying the dominant institution responsible for delivering the outcomes.  

There are, in fact, two stages in the elaboration of an institutional arrangement for governance: the negotiation stage and the implementation stage. In an effort to avoid ‘concept stretching’, Treib et al exclude “all dimensions from [their] overview of modes of governance which cannot be located on this continuum between public authority and societal self-regulation”. This includes the ‘main interaction orientations’ that can occur between actors ‘from bargaining to arguing to or deliberation’. ​[24]​ For them, therefore, the only important governance institutions are those related to the implementation stage, where markets and hierarchies are the dominant arrangements. A focus on the major mechanism employed to implement a governance arrangement will not satisfy political scientists, however, who are very interested in why one mechanism was chosen over another. We thus require a two-part analysis of modes of governance in the institutional dimension, the first focusing on the internal arrangements for arguing, bargaining and deliberating and the second on the institutions employed to deliver outcomes. 

Cadman has developed a structured framework for understanding the quality of governance arrangements used in global environmental governance and applied it to the forest policy issue area.​[25]​ He investigates the quality of governance arrangements in four forestry institutions: the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), the Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification (PEFC), the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the United Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF). Cadman’s analysis focuses on two critical components of negotiation institutions: how they structure actor participation on the one hand and how they manage the deliberative process on the other. Participation within a governance arrangement can vary on a continuum from highly exclusive to highly inclusive. NAFTA, for example, is an exclusive institution because it incorporates only three countries and recognises only states as legitimate participants. The EU, in contrast, is less exclusive because it involves many more states and its institutional system directly incorporates the views of elected individuals in the European Parliament and the views of major sectors such as business and labour in the negotiation of social policy. This participatory dimension of Cadman’s approach to governance quality is similar to our discussion of modes of governance in the political dimension discussed in the previous section. 

Cadman’s second dimension across which institutions can vary in terms of governance arrangements is their deliberative processes. At one extreme, institutions can foster relatively limited deliberation if they adopt, for example, simple majoritarian voting rules based on an ‘aggregative’ conception of democracy. On issues where a majority are in favour but a substantial minority are against, the opportunity for deep discussion and social learning can be obviated if a vote is quickly called and the minority overruled. At the other end of the spectrum, negotiation processes can be based on all-party consensus interpreted as the absence of active dissent of any single party. In this context, negotiations must continue until a compromise formula is worked out that each party can accede to, if only implicitly, by not voting against it. This ‘deliberative’ conception of democracy requires many more skills from the chairperson than a detailed knowledge of Roberts Rules of Order. 

A third important feature of negotiating institutions, and one not much commented on in the literature, is how they aggregate interests. The dominant mechanism for aggregating interests in most institutions is via space-based territorially delimited constituencies. This is virtually the only mechanism used internationally to structure participation among states, which according to the norm of multilateralism, are viewed as ‘sovereign’ and ‘equal’. Major environmental, economic and social institutions in the United Nations operate on this basis including the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the World Health Organization (WHO). Other, non-special interest aggregation arrangements have been recognised, however. The International Labor Organization (ILO), for example, is a tri-partite arrangement of governments, employers groups and unions; the governing body of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) brings together states and development organizations under a single umbrella; and the FSC has been specifically designed to represent the interests of constituencies divided into three interest chambers and sub-divided between the global North and global South. 

If we limit the structure of negotiating institutions to these two dimensions (aggregative versus consensus decision making and representation by territory versus representation by constituency), then we can identify four modes of governance in the bargaining dimension. These are set out in Table 1 below together with some examples and further discussed in the paragraphs that follow. 

Table 1: Modes of Governance in the Institutional Dimension (Bargaining)
	Aggregative (Majoritarian)	Deliberative (partial/full consensus)
Representation by territory	National parliaments (individuals), UN General Assembly (state representatives); 	Juries; BC Citizens’ Assembly; World Trade Organization; ASEAN; 
Representation by constituency	Stakeholder forums; National Round Tables; International Labor Organization;	Forest Stewardship Council; 
   
The most familiar national bargaining institution is parliament, where individuals from territorial constituencies are elected to a majoritarian forum dominated by a party-political executive that deliberates on and passes legislation. This decision making arrangement can be contrasted with another governance mechanism: stakeholder forums. Stakeholder forums bring together key actors with a ‘stake’ in the outcome into a negotiating forum to debate and decide issues. When majoritarian voting rules prevail, then actors accept that the interests of the minority can be trumped by those of the majority. In contrast to both these arrangements, partial or full deliberation aims at ensuring at least a substantial degree of consensus among participants. Trial juries, where consensus must be reached by all twelve individuals on the guilt or innocence of a defendant, are a classic example of consensus based deliberation. Because the World Trade Organization derived in part from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which had limited authority to negotiate international trade agreements, it too has proceeded on the basis of consensus. Finally, one of the unique features of FSC is its tripartite environmental, social and economic chamber model where substantial consensus is required among all parties to reach a decision. It is these structural features of the FSC that make it sui generis, an instance of global democratic corporatism.​[26]​  

The above analysis of modes of governance in the institutional dimension of bargaining provides a further elucidation of the Great Bear Rainforest Agreement. Howlett et al argue that the BC Government, confronted with a process that was slipping into an ‘institutional void’, sought to regain control of the process and moved it back towards a standard state-driven regulatory arrangement.​[27]​ The analysis presented here, however, would highlight how the LRMP process, a form of stakeholderism, was ultimately transmogrified into a form of inclusive corporatism, obliging the BC Government to engage in meaningful ways to negotiate with other, powerful organised groups including First Nations groups organised into the Coastal First Nations group and environmental civil society organisations and business firms via the Joint Solutions Project. It was the deliberation that occurred in this constituency-based arrangement, which overlay the LRMP process, that enabled an accommodation to be reached among the various actors. Once the accommodation was reached, however, implementation required action especially, but not exclusively, by the BC state government across a huge number of areas. In that sense, Howlett et al are correct to point to hierarchy as the dominant mode of implementation, rather than network or market (see also below). But a role of the market was still retained via the requirement for third-party certification. And networks remain important as mechanisms for informing the wider global community about the resolution of the Great Bear Rainforest struggle. 

More generally, we can see in the above discussion the importance of distinguishing between the institutional modes of governance for negotiating arrangements from those used to implement them. It is important to note, too, that the institutional mechanisms used to implement governance arrangements bear not one-to-one relationship with the actors doing the implementing. Governments can use market modes of governance via, for example, emissions trading schemes. Likewise, business can use networks as the chemical industry did via its Responsible Care program. And finally, civil society groups have sought to use the market directly to achieve their objectives rather than rely on either the state or business. Organic and Fair Trade production are good examples of this direct, market-based approach. 

Modes of Governance in the Regulatory Dimension
The absence of correspondence between actors and institutions carries over into the regulatory dimension of governance, where the focus is on describing the range of potential policy instruments available to coordinate and steer groups of interdependent actors. Conventional discussions of regulation have focused narrowly on those options available to governments, concentrating on ‘command and control’ instruments. Although such regulation did not necessarily always prove to be rigid, precise and centralized, in many cases it was so designed to secure enforcement. It has been one of the notable features of ‘new governance’ to highlight the large number of alternatives that exist. A lot of this literature has developed around New Environmental Policy Instruments (NEPIs), where the debate over the economic costs of heavy handed regulation was especially acute in the 1980s.​[28]​ Today, a vast array of NEPIs has been identified that includes green taxation, easements, certification and labelling schemes, voluntary codes, and more.​[29]​ 

Any attempt to consider ‘modes of governance in the regulatory dimension’ must grapple with the sheer diversity of the policy instruments now available to actors. While Treib et al’s analysis identifies one important feature of these schemes—how they differ in terms of the continuum from rigid to flexible—ultimately the four modes of governance they identify (coercion, framework agreements, targeting and voluntarism) are too simple to grasp the diversity of the instruments available, especially at the domestic level. The problem is that Treib et al use a restricted conception of the difference between policy instruments that focuses on whether they are binding or not binding, which pushes all non-binding instruments into the same broad category. Instead, what is required is to open up the non-binding category to distinguish among different instrument types; and to focus on the core mechanisms that underpin how a NEPI works, its essential inner logic. 

When this is done, it becomes evident that actors coordinate their behaviour with other actors due to four different motivations. These are: fear of punishment, expectation of reward, knowledge of consequences, and force of habit. The first, fear of punishment, underpins conventional regulation, where a failure to coordinate one’s actions with interdependent others results in penalties that range from warnings to fines to imprisonment. Actors may resent having to undertake the required behaviour, and may cheat when the opportunity presents itself, but for much of the time most actors conform to the requirements, although powerful affected groups will lobby to change the arrangements whenever they can. 

Rewards work rather differently and are designed to generate conforming behaviour by enabling actors to gain material benefits from undertaking some actions and not others. The classic example of conforming behaviour using rewards occurs in the market place where individuals, associations and firms conform to avoid taxes, obtain bargains, and earn profits. Individuals who file income tax returns conform to behaviour that sees them claiming as many eligible benefits as they can in an effort to minimise their liability. Companies, likewise, employ highly qualified accountants to advise them on their corporate tax liabilities and options for minimisation. The entire rationale for emissions trading schemes is designed around the incentives such schemes generate for actors to adopt a range of converging behaviour in seeking to lower their carbon emissions to reduce costs and potentially earn credits. High carbon emitting actors will have an incentive to refurbish and/or decommission old plant to reduce their carbon credit purchases, while low carbon emitting firms will have an incentive to reduce their own emissions even further, generating as many credits as they can to sell on the carbon market. 

In contrast to punishment and reward, knowledge of consequences can also influence individual, corporate and societal behaviour and constitutes a third rationale for the development of information instruments of governance. At one level, information instruments can simply involve making previously hard to get information publicly available on a web site so that it is harder to cheat or manipulate the behaviour of vulnerable groups. In Australia, the federal government has experimented with a ‘fuel watch’ scheme which posts the price of petrol at key outlets in cities across the country. The idea is to prevent local petrol company collusion, a problem that led to an investigation by Australia’s regulatory agency, the Australian Consumer and Competition Commission (ACCC), in the past. Perhaps the more important informational tool, however, has been certification and labelling of products to enable consumers to decide whether to purchase a good based on its process and production methods (PPMs). Another important information instrument is voluntary codes of conduct such as Responsible Care, ISO 9000 and ISO 14000. These provide information to companies along the commodity chain enabling others to judge the degree of commitment to chemical management, quality assurance and the environment. 

A final policy instrument available to actors involves changing the habits of actors by altering the institutional context in which behaviour occurs. Some of the best known examples of ‘new governance’ fall into this category, especially privatisation, corporatisation and contracting out. Once the change has occurred, conventional practices give way to new practices, although it is also evident that such changed institutional arrangements then operate through one of the other governance arrangements, often the market. In the general governance context, the decisions governments have made to corporatize forest management, privatise airports, and contract out prison services, all constitute the setting up of new institutional arrangements to achieve old objectives via new means. Old habits of state-led provisioning have given way to new arrangements via government business enterprises, contracting out, public private partnerships, and so forth. 













Table 2: Modes of Governance in the Regulatory Dimension
	Regulatory Instrument Rationale
	Expectation of reward	Fear of punishment	Knowledge of consequences	Altered habits
Examples	taxes; levies; subsidies; RDS; licence fees; tradable emissions rights; 	bans; technology standards;mandatory codes;	advertising; certification and labelling schemes; voluntary codes; transparency initiatives;	privatisation;corporatisation;contracting out (e.g., viaPPPs); easements; tenure reform;
Possible Factors	Likelihood of Application
Bindingness	Likely binding	Likely binding	Likely nonbinding	Likely binding
Precision	Likely precise	High variability	High variability	Likely precise
Centralisation	Likely centralised at national level; decentralised from international perspective	Likely centralised at national level; but decentralised from international perspective	Likely decentralised at national and international level	Likely centralised at national level; decentralised from international perspective




How do these various features of governance combine together in practice? To date we have insufficient case studies of governance that systematically explore its dimensions and modes. Thus, it is not yet possible to state with certainty either the existence or form of specific governance ‘syndromes’—repeated combinations of the same governance dimensions and modes of governance. Consequently, both deductive and inductive approaches are required to gain a better understanding of the matter. A deductive approach, building on Treib et al’s framework as elaborated here, is required to critically evaluate the logical coherence of the approach and to refine the theoretical dimensions and modes of governance and the possible interrelationships among them. A complementary inductive approach, based on an accumulation of case studies, is also required. It will provide an evidence base to assess the utility of emerging frameworks and reveal the practical form that governance syndromes take if they exist. 






Institutional Dimension II (Implementation Mechanisms)
Hierarchy					Market						Network

Institutional Dimension 1 (Negotiation Mechanisms)
Authoritarian		Majoritarian	      Partial Consensus	         Full Consensus

Political Dimension (Actors)
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